Vol. 13 No. 6 © ICC Association 2004; all rights reserved
Explicating political hazards and safeguards: a transaction cost politics approach
Correspondence: Witold J. Henisz, The Wharton School, 2021 Steinberg HallDietrich Hall, University of Pennsylvania, PA, USA. Email: henisz{at}wharton.upenn.edu
Abstract
We apply the logic of comparative institutional analysis to the question of the governance of the relationship between private investors and the government. We consider two strategies that investors may follow: lobbying for the creation of a specialized political governance structure and relying on more general political mechanisms to influence policy in a given industry on an ongoing basis. We identify political hazards as a crucial determinant of the choice of political governance and the transactional attributes that give rise to such hazards. Finally, we highlight shift parameters in a nations institutional environment that influence the choice between specialized and generalized political governance mechanisms.
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