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Industrial and Corporate Change, Volume 8, Number 1, pp. 41-65
© 1999 Oxford University Press

Inexperienced and experienced players in an oligopolistic market game with minimal information

R Nagela and NJ Vriendb

a Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona, Spain
b Queen Mary and Westfield College, University of London, UK. E-mail: n.vriend@qumw.ac.uk

Abstract

We consider an oligopolistic market game, in which the players are competing firms in the same market of a homogeneous consumption good. The consumer side is represented by a fixed demand function. The firms decide how much to produce of a perishable consumption good, and they decide upon a number of information signals to be sent into the population in order to attract customers. Due to the minimal information provided, the players do not have a well-specified model of their environment. Given a simple mode of adaptive behavior, which we showed in a previous paper explained the data relatively well, our main objective here is to analyze whether experienced players behave differently to inexperienced players.


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Home page
 Journal of Competition Law and EconomicsHome page
C. Engel
HOW MUCH COLLUSION? A META-ANALYSIS OF OLIGOPOLY EXPERIMENTS
Journal of Competition Law and Economics, December 1, 2007; 3(4): 491 - 549.
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